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ARGUMENT 
POINT I; APPELLEE HAS FAILED TO OFFER PERSUASIVE 
EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT TO PROVE THAT AN AUTO AUCTION IS 
A ^RECOGNIZED MARKET' FOR THE COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE 
SALE OF A VEHICLE. 
Appellant's position that Appellee's sale of the vehicle was 
commercially unreasonable has not been disproven by Appellee. 
Appellee's response to Appellant's brief is basically in two parts. 
First, Appellee argues that the sale of the repossessed vehicle at 
a wholesalers-only auto auction was a commercially reasonable sale 
through a recognized market and thus Appellee claims to be entitled 
to a deficiency from this sale. Second, Appellee argues that 
governing law should hold that, because a wholesalers-only auction 
is a recognized market for the sale of a repossessed vehicle, the 
methods of dealers in used vehicles should be ignored, and that the 
Appellant, therefore, failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact precluding summary judgment. Both of Appellee's arguments 
fail for lack of support from the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
case law interpreting it. 
As the Appellant argued in his Brief, the law does not support 
Appellee's notion that a wholesalers-only auto auction is a 
"recognized market" for disposing of a vehicle. Appellee's Brief 
cited to several cases as evidence of this position. However these 
cases are distinguishable and fail on their own grounds. 
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Appellee relies upon Cfrrysler-Dodqe Country vt Cyrley, 782 
P. 2d 536 (Utah App. 1989) . Chrysler-Dodge involves the private 
sale of a repossessed vehicle. At first, the dealer attempted to 
make a public sale: "the dealer repaired and cleaned the truck and 
placed it on its car lot for sale. The truck was advertised and 
shown on the retail lot with little interest from prospective 
purchasers. Chrysler Dodge then solicited bids for the truck from 
other dealers." Chrysler-Dodge at 537. Eventually, the dealer 
sold the vehicle to another Chrysler dealership for a price higher 
than any other dealership had bid. 
These facts alone support Appellant's position that this case 
is distinguishable from the cases cited by Appellee. The dealer 
first marketed the vehicle retail to the general public to obtain 
the best price possible for the sale of the vehicle and only 
resorted to a wholesale private sale after its attempt at obtain a 
retail price failed. The Chrysler-Dodge opinion states, 
"It is the duty of the secured party to obtain the best 
price possible for the benefit of the debtor. However, 
the secured party does not have to use extraordinary 
means. There is no requirement or prohibition that the 
dealer must sell at wholesale or retail, but only that 
the secured party obtains the best possible price under 
the circumstances." 
Id. At 541^542 (internal citations omitted). 
While a retail sale is not required, it is required that the 
best possible price be obtained, which indicates that a wholesale 
price or less only be accepted after a retail sale was attempted. 
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The conduct of the several parties in Chrysler-Dodge is 
precisely the same procedure which the Appellant has advocated 
below. Contrary to this procedure, Appellee here made absolutely 
no effort to sell the vehicle for anything more than a wholesale 
price. Appellee cannot rely upon Chrysler-Dodae to support its 
claim that the auto auction is a recognized market for obtaining 
the best price for a used vehicle. 
In fact, the court notes in Chrysler-Dodae that the 
authorities are split as to whether repossessed vehicles are even 
included in the "recognized market" exception of the U.C.C. The 
court therein cites one case which holds that an auto auction is a 
recognized market under the U.C.C. and two cases which hold that a 
used vehicle is not customarily sold in such a market. See 
Chrysler-Dodge, p.540, fn.6. Our own practical observation should 
guide us here. If an auto auction is a "recognized market" for the 
disposition of used cars, why do we have such a large number of 
used car sales lots? This case fails to support Appellee's 
position that the auction is a recognized market and that the sale 
was commercially reasonable. 
The Appellee also relies upon Cottom v. Heppner, 777 P.2d 468 
(Utah 1989), a case involving the sale of repossessed cattle at a 
livestock auction. As with Chrysler-Dodge, the court in Cottom 
noted a split of authority over the reasonableness of a livestock 
auction as a recognized market, though the court eventually took 
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the position that under the facts of that particular case, the 
jury's special verdict that the auction was a recognized market 
would not be overturned. Such a holding was not a blanket 
endorsement of all auctions, but under the facts of that particular 
case, the special verdict was upheld. 
However, the distinction between the trade of livestock and 
the trade of used vehicles was not ignored by the court. The court 
reviewed the fact that the auction was well advertised, there was 
enthusiastic bidding, and the methods of sale were such as to 
obtain the best price possible for the cattle. Accordingly, Cottom 
offers no more support for Appellee's position than Chrysler-Dodge. 
Failing to find support from cases in this jurisdiction, 
Appellee looks to other states. In both Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Mathis, 660 So.2d 1273 (Miss. 1995) and Daniel v. Ford Motor Credit 
Co., 612 So.2d 483 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992), the respective courts 
concluded that wholesale auto auctions were recognized markets for 
the sale of repossessed vehicles based upon the testimony of expert 
witnesses of the secured party. Such testimony was uncontested by 
the debtor. In neither case was an opposing affidavit filed as 
evidence or produced at trial to show that auto auctions were not 
customarily used as the first resort for selling a used motor 
vehicle. These cases, in addition to being from other states, 
stand for the proposition that if the non-moving party failed to 
file a counter-affidavit to a motion for summary judgment supported 
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by affidavits, or failed to offer opposing testimony, that party 
would lose, and are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. 
Appellee does not even dispute some of the cases and arguments 
cited by Appellant. Appellant argued in his Brief that "Affidavits 
which raise specific evidentiary facts create genuine issues which 
preclude an order of summary judgment." Brief of Appellant, p. 11. 
Appellant cited to Treloaaan v. Treloaaan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985) 
for support of this statement. Only generally did Appellee respond 
to this statement with no response to the case cited. 
Further, Appellee ignored Appellant's citation from Utah case 
law that "The purpose of the ^commercially' reasonable requirement 
is *to get the best price obtainable for the truck'." Brief of 
Appellant, p. 13, Mass v. Allred, 577 P.2d 127, 128 (Utah 1978). 
Appellee argues generally that there is no specific requirement in 
the statute that the vehicle be sold at a retail price. However, 
as noted above, a retail price would clearly be a better price than 
a wholesale price which is the highest that could have been 
obtained at the auto auction in this case. Thus, the purpose of 
the ^commercially reasonable' requirement, to obtain the best price 
reasonable for a repossessed vehicle, would indicate that selling 
the vehicle wholesale at auction with no attempt to sell it at a 
retail price would not be commercially reasonable. This is another 
case and another argument which the Appellee has completely ignored 
and which must be decided in Appellant's favor. 
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Finally, Appellee ignored the point that is really 
determinative in this appeal: Whether an auto auction is a 
recognized market for the sale of a repossessed vehicle and is thus 
a commercially reasonable means of disposing of such a vehicle is 
a question of substantive fact which must be determined on a case 
by case basis with regard to the surrounding circumstances of the 
situation. This is a rule of law laid out by both the Utah Supreme 
Court and the Utah Court of Appeals. If there is any ^governing 
law' on this point, it is this: "In dealing with the issue of 
commercial reasonableness, the Utah Supreme Court has concluded 
that the issue of commercial reasonableness is fact sensitive and 
is thus dependent on the totality of the commercial context" 
Chrysler-Dodae Country v. Curley* 782 P.2d at 539. 
Appellee's claim boils down to this: because Appellee, Larry 
H. Miller Leasing, disposes of used cars through the auto auction 
with no attempt to sell the vehicle at the best possible price, 
which would be retail, the auto auction should be a ^recognized 
market'. This only proves that the auto auction is a recognized 
market for Larry H. Miller Leasing. This is far too arbitrary a 
basis for determining what legally constitutes a recognized market. 
It allows a used car seller to rely on any means, whether or not a 
fair price is obtained for the vehicle, to dispose of a car as long 
as they consistently use the same means. This cannot be the basis 
for determining the commercial reasonableness of a sale. 
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It was therefore inappropriate for the trial court to decide 
the matter of commercial reasonableness based only on precedence of 
Appellee's stated procedure and distinguishable cases and this 
Court should overturn the summary judgment of the trial court. 
POINT II: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AFFIDAVITS BELOW 
CONCERNED THE SUBSTANTIVE FACTS OF THE SUIT AND THUS CREATED A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WHICH SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DECIDED 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Appellee's position that the conflict between the parties' 
affidavits did not concern substantive governing law must also 
fail. As argued above, the governing law in this matter is to be 
determined on a case by case basis where the affidavits are in 
conflict, which in and of itself precludes summary judgment. The 
commercial reasonableness of the sale of a vehicle through a 
wholesalers-only auto auction which would only bring a wholesale 
price or less is the point that liability for the deficiency is 
centered upon. There is no more substantive issue in a deficiency 
case. Accordingly, Appellee's argument fails and the summary 
judgment must be overturned. 
Both parties submitted affidavits concerning the Utah Auto 
Auction as a recognized market for the disposal of a repossessed 
vehicle and whether that was commercially reasonable. However, 
Appellee argued in its Brief that the governing law is such that a 
wholesalers-only auto auction is a recognized market for the sale 
of a used vehicle and is thus a commercially reasonable means for 
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disposing of a repossessed vehicle, and thus, Appellant's Brief did 
not raise any genuine issues of material fact under governing law 
and that summary judgment was therefore appropriate. 
The governing law should first be clarified. As shown above, 
Appellee has failed to prove that the governing law supports its 
position that a wholesaler-only auto auction is a recognized market 
for the commercially reasonable disposition of used cars. In fact, 
the governing law is that such a determination can only be made on 
a case by case basis. 
"In dealing with the issue of commercial 
reasonableness, the Utah Supreme Court has concluded that 
the issue of commercial reasonableness is fact sensitive 
and is thus dependant on the totality of the commercial 
context. ^Whether any particular sale is commercially 
reasonable is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
That determination depends on whether the circumstances 
of the sale and the manner and business context in which 
it occurred support a conclusion that the sale was 
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.'" 
Chrysler-Dodae County v. Curley, 782 P.2d 536, 539 (Utah 
App. 1989), citing Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070-1071 (Utah 1985). 
Instead of relying upon such a case-by-case analysis, Appellee 
turned the Court's attention to Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242 (1986), which clarified the grounds for summary 
judgment (though the case is based on defamation and is otherwise 
irrelevant to the case at Bar). As Appellee quoted, 
[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is 
that there be no genuine issue of material fact. 
Id. at 247-248 (emphasis in original). 
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Appellee failed to mention that the Supreme Court went on to 
note that "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a 
material fact is Agenuine', that is, if the evidence is such that 
a reasonable jury could return a favorable verdict for the 
nonmoving party." Id. at 248. The Court has not required that the 
disputed fact prove the nonmoving party's case, but only that 
"sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be 
shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing 
versions of the truth at trial." Id. at 248-249, citing First 
National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-
289 (1968). 
Accordingly, the plaintiff's Affidavit of Gary Giffen, a 
sixteen year dealer in used vehicles, which stated that a 
repossessed vehicle would only be sold at auction after all other 
attempts to sell the vehicle at a retail price had been exhausted, 
was sufficient evidence to support the dispute over the commercial 
reasonableness of selling a car at auction which should have been 
resolved by the judge or jury, not on summary judgment. The case 
should have been decided on its facts alone, and thus this Court 
should overturn the trial court's Order of Summary Judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons and on the grounds set forth above, the 
Appellee, Larry H. Miller Leasing Co., has failed to show that the 
trial court was correct to order summary judgment against the 
Appellant, Karl E. Jorgenson. As the Appellant has attested, the 
parties' conflicting affidavits created a genuine issue of material 
fact thereby precluding summary judgment. Therefore, this Court 
should reverse the Order of Summary Judgment and any judgment 
resulting therefrom. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of February, 1998. 
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